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International Extradition in Drug Cases
Steven A. Bernholz*
Martin J. Bernholz * *
G. Nicholas Herman* * *
The United States Justice Department is engaged in a zealous
program to locate and apprehend alleged offenders of United States
narcotics laws who reside in foreign countries.' Requests for extradition of these offenders must comport with fundamental tenets of
international jurisprudence, principles of treaty construction, and
nuances of foreign law. While the subject of international extradition has been addressed in numerous scholarly works, 2 virtually
nothing has been written from the standpoint of the criminal defense
bar. Attempting to address such an oversight, this article focuses on
the drug defendant. Much of the discussion directly or analogously
also may apply to criminal offenders of other persuasions.
I.

Basic Principles and Procedure

The United States has entered into more than eighty extradition
treaties, 3 which constitute the legal authority for international extradition. 4 These treaties typically share a set of principles and procedural rules that define the rights of the "contracting" countries and
the accused. A discussion of these principles and procedures illustrates how they apply when the United States seeks extradition of an
alleged drug offender.
* Partner, Coleman, Bernholz, Dickerson, Bernholz, Gledhill & Hargrave, Chapel
Hill, North Carolina. A.B. 1962, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D. 1966,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
** Associate, Coleman, Bernholz, Dickerson, Bernholz, Gledhill & Hargrave, Chapel
Hill, North Carolina. A.B. 1974, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D. 1977,
North Carolina Central University.
*** Associate, Coleman, Bernholz, Dickerson, Bernholz, Gledhill & Hargrave, Chapel
Hill, North Carolina; B.A. 1977, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D. 1981,
Duke University.
I See Reagan's Speech to Justice Department on Plan to Combat Drug Trafficking, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 15, 1982, at A20, col. 3.
2 See, e.g., M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND
PRACTICE (1983); M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1968).
3 This principle was established in Holmes v.Jennison, 39 U.S. 540 (14 Pet.) (1840),
and adhered to in Rauscher v. United States, 119 U.S. 407 (1886), and Factor v. Lauben-

heimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933).
4 See 18 U.S.C. § 1381 (1982).
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The principle of "double criminality" and the doctrine of "specialty" are the most fundamental doctrines of international extradition law. Double criminality provides that the offense for which
extradition is sought must be punishable under the laws of both the
requesting and requested countries by a specified term of imprisonment, usually one or two years. 5 Specialty precludes the requesting
country from prosecuting the defendant for an offense for which he
was not extradited. 6 Thus, the requested country contractually
agrees to extradite a defendant for those offenses that its laws recognize as criminal in consideration for the requesting country's promise not to prosecute the defendant for crimes that are not recognized
by the extraditing country.
Treaties typically also preclude extradition for offenses that
would subject the defendant to double jeopardy or result in his punishment under an ex post facto law. For example, most treaties prohibit the extradition of a defendant for an offense for which he has
already been prosecuted and acquitted by the requesting or requested country or, if convicted, has fully served his sentence. 7
Some treaties further prohibit extradition if the defendant already
has been punished by a third country for the same offense.8 In addition, if prosecution of the defendant is barred by lapse of time under
the laws of the requesting country, extradition will be refused.
Procedurally, the extradition request must be made to the government of the requested country through proper diplomatic channels. The request generally must be accompanied by a description of
the defendant, a statement of the facts, and a text of the laws of the
requesting country that define the offense, including the punishment
and any applicable limitation on legal proceedings. When the extradition request relates to a person who has not yet been convicted in
the requesting country, the request must be accompanied by a warrant of arrest issued by a judge or other judicial officer of the requesting country, along with evidence that, under the laws of the
requested country, would justify the defendant's committal for trial if
the offense had been committed there. As to an already convicted
defendant, the judgment of conviction and a statement showing how
much of a sentence has been served must accompany the request. 9
Under many treaties, the requesting country may apply for the
provisional arrest of the defendant pending the presentation of a for5 1.

SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 137 (1971).
Id. at 146; M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
352-53 (1974).
7 This rule, known as nemo bis in idem debet vexani audis, is based on considerations of
humanity and the policy against double prosecution. S. BEDI, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 171 (1966).

6

8 Id.
9 See M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 6, at 511-12.
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mal extradition request. If such application is made, the requested
country must be provided information that would justify issuing a
warrant for the defendant's arrest if the offense had been committed
in that country.' 0 Most importantly, a defendant provisionally arrested in the requested country must be freed from custody if the
formal extradition request and the requested documents are not received within a specified time from the date of the arrest."
Typically, a magistrate determines whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the defendant's extradition. The magistrate decides
whether the evidence submitted by the requesting country would,
under the laws of the requested country, establish a prima facie case
of guilt in the sense that a reasonable jury could render a guilty verdict. 2 Under appellate or habeas corpus review, a higher court can
determine whether the offense charged is extraditable under the
treaty, and 3 whether the evidence was sufficient to justify
extradition.'

The particular procedures and determinations of an extradition
request vary among treaties. The principles of double criminality
and specialty, however, are universal and the subjects of most litigation. Therefore, examining how these doctrines apply is integral to
representing effectively the rights of an alleged drug offender or
other criminal defendant whose extradition is sought by the United
States.
II.

The Principle of Double Criminality
A.

Generally

Double criminality is the keystone of international extradition
law. Under this principle, an act is not extraditable unless it constitutes a crime under the laws of both the requesting and requested
countries.' 4 Double criminality attempts to ensure that a defendant's liberty is not restricted because of offenses not recognized as
15
criminal in the requested country.
Double criminality is expressly embodied in all United States extradition treaties in one of two forms. The traditional and most common form limits the offense for which extradition may be granted to
those offenses punishable under the laws of both countries by a specified minimum term of imprisonment and listed as extraditable of10

See S. BEDI, supra note 7, at 118.

1 Id. at 127.
12 See, e.g., Schtracks v. Gov't of Israel, [1962] 3 All E.R. 529, 533.
13 Id. at 549-50; see also Regina v. Governor of Brixton Prison ex parte Kolczynski,
[1955] 1 Q.B. 540, 1 All E.R. 31.
14 See I. SHEARER, supra note 5, at 137.
15 Id.
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fenses in the treaty. 16 The second form 17 also limits the offense, but
omits a particular list of extraditable offenses. As a practical matter,
when the United States seeks extradition for drug offenses, the particular form in which the applicable treaty defines double criminality
is inconsequential.
When the treaty embodying double criminality lists extraditable
offenses, it is important not to confuse the list with the principle. For
example, the treaty may list "an offense against the laws relating to
narcotics, dangerous drugs or psychotropic substances."' 8 This
item constitutes only a category of prohibited behavior to which the
specific crime must be applied. The categories of offenses under the
treaty do not make a particular crime extraditable until that crime is
shown to be (a) within one of the listed categories, and
(b) punishable in the requested country.
Most treaties contain provisions that prevent an overly restrictive application of double criminality by acknowledging that extraditable crimes may be categorized or defined differently between the
contracting countries. For instance, a treaty may state that "extradition shall also be granted for aiding, abetting, counseling, or procuring the commission of, being an accessory before or after the fact to,
or attempting or conspiring to commit any of the offenses [specifically listed in the treaty]."' 19 Such a provision is intended primarily
to reach the conspiracy case.
Similarly, the treaty may provide that an offense is also extraditable if "the laws of both Contracting Parties . . .would place that

offense within the same category of offenses made extraditable
[under the Treaty] and whether or not the laws of the requested
State denominates the offense by the same terminology. ' 20 This latter provision is illustrated by the British decision in Ex parte Budlong
& In re Kermber,21 in which the United States sought defendants' extradition on burglary charges. While the elements of burglary in Great
Britain and the United States essentially are identical, the British
16 This form sometimes is referred to as the "Montevideo" type after the Seventh
Inter-American Conference at Montevideo in December

1933.

See, e.g.,

Extradition

Treaty, Jan. 21, 1977, United States-Great Britain and Northern Ireland, appended schedule, 28 U.S.T. 227, T.I.A.S. No. 8468; Extradition Treaty, Mar. 22, 1976, United StatesCanada, art. 2(1), 27 U.S.T. 983, T.I.A.S. No. 8237; Extradition Treaty, Sept. 15, 1972,
United States-Argentina, art. 2, 23 U.S.T. 3501, T.I.A.S. No. 7510; Extradition Treaty,
June 16, 1971, United States-Spain, art. II(A), 22 U.S.T. 737, T.I.A.S. No. 7136; Extradition Treaty, Dec. 8, 1970, United States-New Zealand, art. II, 22 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No.
7035; Extradition Treaty, Dec. 17, 1964, United States-Brazil, art. II, 15 U.S.T. 2093,
T.I.A.S. No. 5691; Extradition Treaty, Dec. 5, 1963, United States-Israel, art. II, 14 U.S.T.

1708, T.I.A.S. No. 5476; Extradition Treaty, Dec. 3, 1963, United States-Sweden, art. II,
14 U.S.T. 1845, T.I.A.S. No. 5496.
17 See, e.g., I. SHEARER, supra note 5, at 219-23 (citing treaties of this form).
18 Extradition Treaty, May 14, 1974, United States-Australia, art. 11(l)(28), 27 U.S.T.
957, 962, T.I.A.S. No. 8234 [hereinafter cited as U.S.-Australia Treaty].
F) Id. at art. 11(4).
Id. at art. 11(5).
21 Regina v. Governor of Pentonville Prison exparte Budlong, [1980] 1 All E.R. 701.
20
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Theft Act also contains the element of "entry as a trespasser," which
is not an element of the United States definition of burglary. Defendants contended that double criminality precluded their extradition on the burglary charges because the elements of the crime were
not identical in the two countries. The court rejected this argument,
holding that double criminality was satisfied because the crime was
"substantially similar" in both countries.
Budlong follows the rule that extradition treaties should be construed liberally rather than narrowly. Such a rule originated in 1896
in In re Arton (No. 2).22 France successfully extradited a defendant
from Great Britain on the crime of "falsification of accounts," which
was deemed substantially the same as "forgery" under British law.
Decisions such as Budlong that have adopted the view that double
criminality is satisfied when the offense is "substantially similar"
under the laws of both countries, however, should not be read to
nullify the principle. It is the gravamen of the offense that is at issue
and not simply whether the elements of the crime defined by the
23
contracting countries correspond.
"Substantially similar" crimes are those that substantially prohibit a special type of criminal behavior that each country seeks to
proscribe. This substantial similarity was lacking in Freedman v.
United States, 24 where Canada sought defendant's extradition from
the United States on a bribery charge, analogous to modern day
"commercial bribery." Freedman reversed the magistrate's extradition ruling because the crime of commercial bribery was unknown to
either state or federal United States law. While United States law
proscribed bribery of private individuals, the purpose of the crime
did not apply in a commercial context in the United States. Thus,
the two species of bribery were not substantively the same.
The principle of double criminality is especially important when
the extradition request is made for an offense that contains a number
of separately recognized predicate crimes.2 5 Recognition of such
predicate crimes by the requested country does not automatically
make the comprehensive offense extraditable, because double criminality requires that the offense be punishable by the requested country. While that country separately may provide punishment for
certain predicate crimes contained within the offense for which extradition is sought, the requested country's laws may not punish a
foreign offense that is composed chiefly of a conglomeration of distinct and separately punishable crimes.
Finally, despite a generally liberal approach toward double crim22 [1896] 1 QB. 509.
23 See Feller, The Significance of the Requirement of Double Criminality in the Law of Extradi-

tion, 10 ISR. L.R. 66 (1975).
24 437 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
25 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 848(b) (1982); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Practices
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
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inality, some countries continue to adhere to a more restrictive view.
Recently, for example, in Attorney Generalv. Cohen2 6 the United States
sought the extradition of a defendant for committing an oral act of
sex with a fourteen-year-old girl. Because the treaty list made extraditable only the "unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl under age," the
Jerusalem district court held that extradition was limited to the offense of sexual intercourse with a minor, and thus, extradition could
27
not extend to other forms of prohibited sexual contact.
B.

Application of Double Criminality to CCE and RICO

Double criminality has special significance when applied to complex United States drug crimes such as Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) 28 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO).2 9 A drug offender convicted of CCE in
the United States faces a prison term of not less than twenty years
and as long as life, without the possibility of parole.3 0 For single
RICO violations, imprisonment may be as long as twenty years. 3' In
some cases, based on the defendant's same unlawful conduct, CCE
and RICO convictions have been combined to produce extraordinarily severe sentences. 32 Because CCE and RICO are solely creatures
of United States law, a defendant whose extradition is sought by the
United States on such charges may argue successfully that the foreign country cannot extradite him, because these crimes do not constitute extraditable offenses under the treaty.
There are five elements of CCE. First, the defendant must have
violated one of the substantive drug crimes under Title XXI of the
United States Code, such as manufacturing, distributing, dispensing,
possessing with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance, 33 conspiracy to commit the foregoing, 34 importation of controlled substances, 3 5 manufacturing or distributing a
controlled substance intending that such substance will be imported
unlawfully, 36 or conspiracy to commit the foregoing relative to im26 Misc. App. 369/80 (unpublished), cited and discussed in M. GOULDMAN, TRANSNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

182 (1983).

27 Id.

28 21 U.S.C. § 848(b) (1982).
29 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
30 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(1)(c) (1982). The average CEE sentence is 35 years. See Kadish, The Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute: A Powerful Weapon for Federal Prosecutors, 19
TRIAL 66 (1983).

31 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982).
32 See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1981) (defendants who
had no significant prior criminal records received sentences of 33, 53, and 64 years on
RICO and CCE convictions).
33 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1982).
34 Id. § 846.
35 Id. § 952.
36 Id. § 959.
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portation.3 7 Second, the substantive drug crime must be part of a
continuing series of drug violations. Third, the defendant must have
undertaken the series of violations in concert with five or more other
persons. Fourth, the defendant must have been an organizer, supervisor, or other type of manager. Finally, the defendant must have
38
obtained substantial income or resources from the violations.
When the United States seeks extradition of a defendant on a
CCE charge, which is not recognized in the requested country, the
argument for extradition most likely will be based upon a treaty provision similar to that found in the United States-Australia Treaty:
Extradition shall also be granted for any offense against a federal law
of the United States of America of which one of the [offenses listed
as extraditable in the treaty] is a substantial element, even if trans-

porting or transportation or the use of the mails3 or
9 of interstate facilities is also an element of the specific offense.
Based on this language, the United States may argue that CCE is
an extraditable offense, although it is not recognized by the requested country. For instance, substantive drug crimes such as importation, manufacturing, and possession with intent to distribute
controlled substances, which are clearly punishable in the United
States and the requested country, are extraditable because they fall
within the listed treaty category of "offenses against the laws relating
to narcotics, dangerous drugs or psychotropic substances." '40 Furthermore, the extraditable offenses of importation, manufacturing,
and possession with intent to distribute controlled substances are
"substantial elements" of CCE, thus making CCE extraditable under
the Australian provision. Finally, the Supreme Court in Jeffers v.
United States4 ' held that conspiracy is a lesser included offense of
CCE, because proof of acting in concert with five or more persons
necessarily requires proof of a conspiracy. Because conspiracy to violate the narcotics laws is both an extraditable offense and a substantial element of CCE, the Australian Treaty provision thus makes CCE
an extraditable offense.
This argument is based logically upon a literal reading of the
Australian Treaty. It is erroneous, however, because it ignores the
intent of the Treaty provision when compared to similar provisions
in other treaties and their negotiating histories. For example, the
United States-New Zealand Treaty has a similar provision at article
II:

Extradition shall also be granted for any offense of which one of the
[offenses listed as extraditable in the treaty] is the substantial element, when for purposes of granting jurisdiction to the United
37 Id. § 963.
38 Id. § 848(b)(2)A-B.

39 U.S.-Australia Treaty, supra note 18, at art. 11(3).
40 Id. at art. II(l)(28).
41 432 U.S. 137 (1977).
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States Government, transporting
or transportation is also an ele42
ment of the specific offense.
In the Letter of Submittal from the United States President to the
Senate in connection with the ratification of the New Zealand Treaty,
it is said that with respect to article II, "the jurisdictional elements on
which United States Federal offenses are often based-the transporting or transportation elements-shall be viewed as jurisdictional elements only and not as the offense itself. . . . This provision permits
extradition for such Federal offenses when a listed offense is a substantial element of the Federal offense." ' 43 The Letters of Submittal
accompanying the United States extradition treaties with Spain, 44 Japan, 4 5 and Mexico 4 6 are in accord.
Therefore, any argument by the United States that provisions
like those found in the Australian and New Zealand treaties create a
new category of extraditable offenses beyond those that are punishable in both countries and are listed as extraditable crimes in the
treaty is untenable. These types of provisions are purely jurisdictional and are designed solely to make offenses extraditable that
otherwise satisfy double criminality but contain additional jurisdictional elements, such as interstate transportation, use of interstate
facilities, or use of the mails, which are necessary to invoke United
States federal jurisdiction but are not found in foreign law. In the
absence of treaty provisions that provide for these elements, the
United States could not request extradition for most of the listed offenses, because the United States would not have jurisdiction over
them.
Because these types of treaty provisions are solely jurisdictional
in nature, however, they cannot be relied upon to make CCE an extraditable offense. None of the five elements of CCE requires proof
of a special jurisdictional element, such as use of the mails or other
means of interstate facilities or transport, to satisfy federal criminal
jurisdiction requirements under United States law. Accordingly,
these provisions will not apply to determine whether CCE is an extraditable crime.
For purposes of double criminality, the remaining question is
whether CCE falls within the list of extraditable offenses in the treaty
and is a crime under the laws of the requested country. While CCE
requires proof of a series of substantive narcotics violations, among
42 Extradition Treaty, Jan. 12, 1970, United States-New Zealand, art. II, 22 U.S.T. 1,

3,T.I.A.S. No. 7035.
43 Pres. Nixon's Letter of Submittal, Dep't of State (Feb. 5, 1970).
44 Extradition Treaty, May 29, 1970, United States-Spain, art. 11(d), 22 U.S.T. 737,
740, T.I.A.S. No. 7136.
45 Extradition Treaty, Mar. 3, 1978, United States-Japan, art. 11(l), 31 U.S.T. 892,
894, T.I.A.S. No. 9625.
46 Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, United States-Mexico, art. 2, para. 4(b), 31 U.S.T.
5059, 5062-63, T.I.A.S. No. 9656.
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other elements, the determination of whether it is recognized as punishable in the requested country must be made with reference to
CCE as a whole and not its separate parts. Extradition is sought,
granted, or denied on the basis of the overall crime.
In addition to the commission of a series of violations against
United States narcotics laws, CCE contains the elements of acting in
concert with five or more persons, occupying a position of organizer,
supervisor, or other position of management, and obtaining substantial income or resources. 4 7 According to CCE's legislative history
and case law, the latter elements make the crime a special and distinct offense from underlying drug offenses, such as manufacturing,
distribution, possession, importation, or conspiracy. 48 CCE is primarily directed not at "concerted drug violations," but at those who
make substantial profits from illicit drug activity in a highly organ49
ized business enterprise.
When the elements of CCE are combined, it is clear that the
offense is an exclusive genus of United States criminal law. Because
it is not punishable in foreign countries, it cannot satisfy double
criminality, and thus, does not qualify as an extraditable offense.
Double criminality also may apply when extradition is sought on
RICO charges. The analysis is made more difficult, however, in light
50
of the Canadian Supreme Court decision in Sudar v. United States
that RICO is an extraditable offense even though it is not recognized
under Canadian law.
In Sudar the United States sought extradition of defendant on a
RICO indictment charging him with engaging in an enterprise and a
pattern of racketeering with respect to murder, threats of murder,
arson, and extortion. 5 ' The court observed that under RICO the
prosecutor must prove the existence of an enterprise, a pattern of
activity, and an effect on interstate commerce, along with the illegal
activities of such an enterprise. While the court conceded that RICO
was unknown to Canadian law, it reasoned that an "enterprise" has
been construed by United States courts as being synonymous with
47 21 U.S.C. § 848(b)(2) (1982).
48 See United States v.Jeffers, 532 F.2d 1101, 1110-11 (7th Cir. 1976) (purpose of2l
U.S.C. § 848 is to punish those who make a substantial income through violation of drug
laws); H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprintedin 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4566, 4575 (statute said to be different in character and purpose from other federal
drug laws).
49 H.R. REP., supra note 48, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4575.

See also United States v. Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323, 1344 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding indictment
not defective merely because names of five people acting in concert were not specified);
United States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588, 602 (2d Cir. 1973) (describing § 848 as a severe
regulation aimed at drug trafficking on a continuing, serious, widespread, supervisory, and
substantial basis); United States v. Fry, 413 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (suggesting that statute be read broadly to effectuate its purposes).
50 25 S.C.R.3d 183 (1981).
51 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, 1962(c)-(d) (1982).
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"conspiracy," which is clearly an extraditable offense, and that the
element of "affecting interstate commerce" was important only as
"an internal concern in [the United States]," 52 and thus, was not the
gravamen of RICO. Finally, the court noted that there was no question that murder, threats of murder, and extortion were extraditable
offenses. Accordingly, the court held that RICO was an extraditable
offense within the
meaning of article 2(3) of the United States53
Canada Treaty.
The principal flaw in the Sudar reasoning is its failure to account
properly for the key elements of a RICO offense that make the crime
peculiar to United States law. 54 RICO punishes both the legal 5 5 and

illegal5 6 acquisition of an enterprise with money derived from a pattern of racketeering activity, the illegal acquisition, other than by
money, of an interest in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering, 57 and the operation of an enterprise through a pattern of racke-

teering.5 8 In the context of drug offenses, racketeering refers to
"dealing in narcotics or other dangerous drugs" under both state
and federal law. 5 9 To satisfy federal jurisdiction requirements, it
must be shown only
that the activities of the enterprise affect inter60
state commerce.
The pattern and enterprise components of a RICO offense have
been held to be separate elements. 6 1 Defining these elements has
been confounded by judicial legislation and controversy. According
to the language of RICO, a pattern means that the defendant committed at least two acts of racketeering activity within ten years of
each other. 62 Additionally, some courts have required proof of a
common scheme, plan, or motive relating to the racketeering acts, 63
while other courts make it necessary to show only a nexus between
52 25 S.C.R.3d at 187.
53 Id.; Extradition Treaty, Dec. 3, 1971, United States-Canada, art. 2(3), 27 U.S.T.
983, 986, T.I.A.S. No. 8237 states:
Extradition shall also be granted for any offense against a federal law of the
United States in which one of the offenses listed [as extraditable in the treaty]
is a substantial element, even if transporting, transportation, the use of the
mails or interstate facilities are also elements of the specific offense.
Id.
54 For the most erudite article on RICO, see Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV.
291 (1983).
55 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982).
56 See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981).
57 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1982).
58 Id. § 1962(c).
59 Id.§ 1961(1)(a) & (d).
60 United States v.Allen, 656 F.2d 964 (4th Cir. 1981).
61 Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583.
62 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982).
63 See, e.g., United States v. Starnes, 644 F.2d 673, 678 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
826 (1981).
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the racketeering activities and the enterprise. 64
Courts have been even more divergent in their definitions of the
enterprise element. The Supreme Court has stated that an enterprise involves "a group of persons associated together for a common
purpose of engaging in a course of conduct," and "an on-going organization, formal or informal, in which the various associates function as a continuing unit."' 65 Interpreting this definition, the Fourth
Circuit stated that an illegal enterprise must have a "separate existence," which must be proved by a "common purpose" with evidence
of a unit characterized66 by "continuity, unity, shared purpose and
identifiable structure."
On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit 6 7 and the Justice Department 68 have taken the view that an enterprise must have a formal
"ascertainable" structure directed toward an economic goal that has
an existence apart from the commission of the predicate acts constituting the pattern of racketeering activity.
The Sudar ruling confuses the racketeering acts underlying a
RICO offense with the pattern and enterprise elements that make the
offense distinct from the racketeering acts. RICO does not become
an offense merely upon proof of racketeering acts. When standing
alone, the Sudar racketeering acts of murder, threats of murder, and
extortion give rise to three separate offenses, but without more, do
not make up a RICO offense. Sudar ignores decisions holding that
the pattern requirement in RICO makes the crime separate from the
69
predicate racketeering offenses that may establish the pattern.
Although Sudar recognizes that a pattern of racketeering activity is an
element of RICO, it ignores the meaning of that element, which requires proof of a common plan or motive relating to the racketeering
acts or a nexus between those acts and the enterprise.
Similarly, Sudar misapprehends the enterprise element of RICO.
Under United States law, conspiracy may be a predicate offense to
racketeering. 70 Sudar construes the Supreme Court 7 definition of
"enterprise" as being synonymous with conspiracy, 7 2 which is erroneous. Construing the enterprise element as being equivalent to
conspiracy is tantamount to eliminating the enterprise element from
RICO.
64 See, e.g., United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1122-23 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 871 (1980).
65 Turkette, 452 U.S. at 576.
66 United States v. Griffin, 660 F.2d 996, 999-1000 (4th Cir. 1981).
67 United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 665 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980).
68 UNITED STATES ATrORNEY'S MANUAL, § 9.110.101 (Mar. 9, 1984).
69 See, e.g., United States v. Boylan, 620 F.2d 359, 361 (2d Cir. 1981).
70 Weisman, 624 F.2d at 1123-24.
71 Turkette, 452 U.S. at 576.

72 Sudar, 25 S.C.R.3d at 186.
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The Supreme Court, however, has said that the pattern and enterprise elements of RICO are distinct. 73 Because the pattern of
racketeering element is deemed to be separate from predicate racketeering acts that may establish the pattern, 74 and the pattern and enterprise elements of RICO are distinct, the enterprise element under
RICO syllogistically cannot mean merely conspiracy. Thus, Sudar
again confuses the pattern and enterprise elements of RICO with the
underlying racketeering acts that serve as predicates to the offense.
Sudar properly views the requirement of an "effect on interstate
commerce" as an internal jurisdictional element covered by article
2(3) of the United States-Canada Treaty. 7 5 Sudar's simple, neat analysis of RICO, however, logically cannot support the warrant for extradition on that peculiar United States offense by stretching the
elements to fit something that is wholly unknown to Canadian criminal law. The Sudar analysis succeeds only if article 2(3) is read literally and without regard to the intent.
Thus, under the principle of double criminality, because RICO
is unknown to foreign law, the requested country should not grant
extradition of an alleged drug offender for a RICO offense. At best,
the requested country should grant extradition only on the predicate
drug offense underlying the RICO charge, assuming it is recognized
and punishable under the laws of that country.
III. The Doctrine of Specialty
Specialty provides that a defendant may be tried in the requesting country only for an offense for which the requested country specifically extradited him. If the requesting country seeks to prosecute
the defendant for a different offense, the defendant must first be allowed to leave the country to which he was extradited. 76 The doctrine is concomitant with double criminality because, if a particular
offense is not extraditable under the applicable treaty, the defendant
cannot be prosecuted for that offense after he returns to the request77
ing country.
Five factors underlie the specialty doctrine. First, the requested
country can refuse extradition if it knows that the defendant will be
prosecuted for an offense other than that for which extradition is
granted. Second, the requesting country does not have in personam
jurisdiction over the defendant except for the requested country's
surrender of him. Third, the requesting country cannot prosecute
the defendant without securing his surrender from the requested
73 Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583.
74 Boylaii, 620 F.2d at 361.

75 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
76 See I. SHEARER, supra note 5, at 146.
77 See M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 6, at 354.
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country. Fourth, the requesting country must rely on the requested
country's laws to effectuate surrender. Finally, the requested country undertakes extradition in reliance on the representations made
by the requesting country. 78 In light of these factors, any violation of
the specialty doctrine effectively could79 destroy the extradition relations between the countries involved.
Specialty usually is embodied expressly in the treaty. Different

treaties, however, provide different limitations on the doctrine. For
example, a particular treaty may limit the requesting country's prosecution of the defendant to: (1) the specific offenses for which extradition was granted only; (2) to "any extraditable offense" in addition
to the offense for which extradition was granted; 80 or (3) to both the
offense for which extradition was granted and to "any offense for
which the person could be convicted upon proof of the facts upon
8
which the request for extradition was based." '
The first two provisions are classic expressions of the specialty
doctrine. It should be noted that under the third provision, the requesting country still could not prosecute the defendant for an offense that does not satisfy double criminality. In construing
provisions of the third type, the defendant
can be tried for any offense established by the facts supporting the
original request, provided it is a kindred offense which is based on
the same facts but which would be an extraditable offense and satisfy
the requirement of double criminality.

.

.

. Any variance from the

82
above will be deemed a violation of the Doctrine of Specialty.

Where there is no express treaty provision embracing specialty,
the doctrine nevertheless is adhered to as a rule of international or

municipal law. For example, Germany has upheld the doctrine as a
rule of international law even though the relevant treaty was silent
on the point. Thus, a defendant could not be prosecuted in Ger83
many for an offense for which he was not extradited.
In United States v. Rauscher8 4 the Supreme Court adopted
doctrine of specialty as a rule of United States municipal law.
cordingly, in In re Woodhall,8 5 when the United States requested
tradition of a defendant from England pursuant to a treaty that

the
Acexwas

silent about specialty, the British court rejected the defendant's contention that there was no certainty that she would not be tried for
78 Id.

79 See Feller, Reflections on the Nature of the Specialty Principle in Extradition Relations, 12
ISR. L.R. 471 (1977).

80 Id. at 492-94.
81 See U.S.-Australia Treaty, supra note 18, at art. XIV(1).
82 See M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 6, at 356-57.
83 See Bataclan, An Analysis of the Philippine-IndonesianExtradition Treaty, 54 PHIL. L.J. 63,
76 (1979).
84 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
85 57 L.J.M.C. 72 (1888).
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offenses other than those for which extradition would be granted because Rauscher had clearly established the doctrine as the law in the
United States.
While a number of United States treaties expressly prohibit trying a defendant for an offense for which extradition is not granted, a
majority contain provisions under which the requested country may
waive the specialty doctrine and consent to the trial of a defendant
for offenses not specifically included in the extradition order.8 6 The
precise wording of these provisions and the municipal law of the requested country are crucial in determining whether there may be a
total waiver of the doctrine, or whether it may be waived with respect
only to offenses that satisfy double criminality.
For example, assume that Italy requests that the United States
consent to the trial of an Italian defendant for an offense for which
extradition was not granted, and the particular offense is not a crime
in the United States. The United States-Italy Treaty of 1973 provides that the requested country may consent to the trial of a defendant "for an offense other than that for which extradition was
granted." 8 7 This provision does not contain language limiting consent only to offenses that satisfy the principle of double criminality.
Thus, the United States could waive completely the doctrine of
specialty.
The result does not change because of conflicting language in
United States municipal law, which authorizes only the Secretary of
State to order the surrender of a defendant to a foreign government
"to be tried for the offense charged" in the extradition request.8 8 If
the Italian defendant contended that this statute precludes the
United States from consent to his trial in Italy for an offense that
neither was granted nor recognized as a crime in the United States,
he probably would lose in United States courts. Language in the municipal law is wholly incompatible and antagonistic to the consent
would be regarded
provision in the treaty, and hence, the later treaty
89
as repealing the earlier statute by implication.
Assume, however, that the United States requests that Australia
consent to the trial of a United States citizen for an offense for which
extradition was not granted and which does not satisfy the principle
of double criminality because it is not punishable in Australia. The
United States-Australia Treaty provides that the requested country
may consent to the trial of a defendant for an offense other than that
for which extradition has been granted when the offense "is an of86 See George, Toward a More PrincipledApproach to the Principleof Specialty, 12 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 309, 311-13 (1979).
87 Extradition Treaty, Jan. 18, 1973, United States-Italy, art. XV, para. 3, 26 U.S.T.
493, 503 T.I.A.S. 8052.

88 21 U.S.C. § 3186 (1982).
89 Id.; see Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309, 320-21 (1907).
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fense mentioned in Article II."90 Because article II of the treaty
makes an offense extraditable only if it is listed in that article and is
punishable by both Australia and the United States, the consent provision may apply only to offenses that fall within the list and satisfy
double criminality. Moreover, this result is substantiated by Australian municipal law, which permits the Attorney General of that country to consent to the surrender of a defendant on "any other
extradition crime." 9' An "extradition crime" is defined as one listed
9 2
in the treaty and punishable in both countries.
The foregoing examples underscore the differences in the consent provisions of particular treaties and the municipal laws of requested countries. If the requested country can waive the specialty
doctrine only with respect to offenses that satisfy the principle of
double criminality, a United States defendant charged with CCE or
certain fiscal crimes9 3 not recognized as offenses in the foreign country or under the treaty should be protected by the doctrine and cannot be tried on those offenses after being extradited to the United
States. This result arguably would be different, however, if the consent provision contained language similar to that in the United
States-Italy Treaty. In such cases, a defendant is relegated to the
much weaker argument that a requested country's total waiver of the
specialty doctrine is impermissible, because it essentially nullifies the
internationally recognized principle of double criminality.
United States case law on the specialty doctrine also is enlightening for a defendant faced with the possibility of being tried for
94
offenses for which he was not extradited. For example, in Rauscher
defendant, a United States seaman, was indicted in federal court for
assault and unlawful infliction of "cruel and unusual punishment"
upon another person. He fled to England and subsequently was extradited to the United States. The extradition request, however, was
not on the basis of assault and cruel and unusual punishment, but
murder. Defendant was tried in the United States and convicted of
inflicting cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction after finding that the extradition treaty between the United States and Great Britain did not embrace the crime
of cruel and unusual punishment, and therefore, under the specialty
doctrine, defendant could not be extradited for murder. The Court
stated:
That right, as we understand it, is that he shall be tried only for the
90 See U.S.-Australia Treaty, supra note 18, at arts. VI, XI(3).

91 Extradition (Commonwealth countries) Act of 1966, Austl. L.C. Acts, Ch. 75, part
II, § l1(3)(a)(ii).
92 Id. § 4(l)(a).

93 See, e.g.,
31 U.S.C. §§ 5316, 5322 (1982) (transporting U.S. currency without reporting); 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1982) (income tax evasion).
94 Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 407.
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offense with which he is charged in the extradition proceedings, and
for which he was delivered up; and that, if not tried for that, or after
trial and acquittal, he shall have a reasonable time to leave the country before he is arrested upon the
charge of any other crime commit95
ted previous to his extradition.
Rauscher stands for the rule that United States courts will not try

a defendant extradited from another country for a crime not listed in
the applicable treaty,9 6 as well as for those crimes listed in the treaty
but for which extradition, for whatever reason, was not granted by
the requested country.9 7 Modern litigation under Rauscher, however,
generally has focused on whether the offense for which the government seeks prosecution falls outside the scope of the foreign coun98
try's extradition decree.
Some cases suggest a liberal approach toward permitting prosecution. For example, in Fiocconi v. Attorney Generalof the United States"9
the United States sought defendants' extradition from Italy on
charges of conspiring to import heroin. Because narcotics crimes
were not listed in the extradition treaty between the two countries,
the extradition request was based upon comity, under which Italy
could grant extradition if the offenses constitute crimes in Italy. Italy
extradited defendants on charges of conspiracy. After being returned to the United States, however, defendants also were charged
with receiving, concealing, selling, and facilitating the transportation, concealment, and sale of heroin. Defendants challenged these
charges under the specialty doctrine on the ground that Italy's extradition decree referred only to conspiracy.
Rejecting the challenge, the court held that a trial on the additional charges would not constitute a "breach of faith" by the United
States toward Italy's extradition decree. The court reasoned that in
the absence of "any affirmative protest from Italy," it was unlikely
that Italy would oppose the prosecution of defendants for the additional charges, which were "of the same character" as the conspiracy
charge for which the defendants were specifically extradited.' 0 0
Similarly, in United States v. Paroutian'0 the court upheld the
conviction of a defendant on charges of receipt and concealment of
heroin. These counts, however, were not included in the indictment
charging conspiracy to traffic in narcotics, which was the basis of defendant's extradition from Lebanon. The court did not believe "that
the Lebanese, fully apprised of the facts as they were, would consider
95 Id. at 424.

96
(1973).
97
98
99

See, e.g., Shapiro v. Ferradina, 478 F.2d 894, 905 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 881
See Johnson, 205 U.S. at 309.
See United States v. Flores, 538 F.2d 939, 944 (2d Cir. 1976).
462 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972).

00 Id. at 481.
10I 299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962).
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that Paroutian was tried for anything else but the offense for which
02
he was extradited, namely, trafficking in narcotics."'
The Fiocconi and Paroutian decisions should not be construed to
mean that United States law does not honor the specialty doctrine as
established by the Rauscher court. A proper reading of the Fiocconi
case is that the doctrine does not apply when extradition is granted
on the basis of comity-where there is no applicable treaty, or extradition is granted independent of a treaty.' 0 3 While there have been
some exceptions, United States law generally professes exclusive adherence to treaties as the sole basis for extradition, 10 4 and rendition
0 5
of defendants through comity has not been employed often.'
United States v. Flores10 6 illustrates how a defendant may be best
protected against prosecution in the United States for offenses for
which he was not extradited. In Flores the extradition country, Spain,
stated in its extradition order that the grant of extradition was "limited solely and exclusively" to the alleged crime of conspiracy, "and
it is understood that the extradition is contingent upon the formal
promise of the United States Government that the [defendant] will
not be prosecuted for previous offenses or offenses foreign to this
extradition request unless he expressly consents to such prosecution." 0 7 In a formal note from the United States embassy to the
Spanish Government, United States authorities promised that "[the
defendant] will not be prosecuted . . . for prior infractions or infractions different than those which are concretely referred to by the decision portion of the dictated decree .... ",108 The Flores court held
that the language of Spain's extradition decree, combined with the
promise of the United States Government, precluded defendant's
prosecution for previous offenses or offenses for which extradition
was not granted.
A defendant's best protection against being tried in the United
States for an offense for which he was not extradited is in the language of the requested country's extradition decree. This is particularly true because United States law has viewed the specialty doctrine
as a privilege of the surrendering country rather than a right that
may be raised by the accused. 10 9
Thus, the defendant should seek to secure an extradition decree
from the requested country that: (1) expressly conditions extradition upon a promise by the United States Government that there will
102 Id. at 490-91.
103 M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 6, at 355.
104 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 732-37 (1968).

See M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 6, at 43.
106 538 F.2d at 939.
107 Id. at 941.
108 Id.
109 See, e.g., 478 F.2d at 894.
105
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not be prosecution in federal or state courts for offenses for which he
was not extradited; (2) provides that if the promise is not made formally by the United States Government, he will not be released to
the United States; (3) expressly refers to the relevant article(s) in the
applicable treaty that embraces the doctrine of specialty; (4) acknowledges the Supreme Court decision of United States v. Rauscher;
and (5) provides that strict compliance with the terms of the extradition decree will assure good faith between the United States and the
requested country in the discharge of extradition pursuant to the
treaty.
IV.

Dealing with Conspiracy Charges

In dicta, United States courts occasionally have expressed disfavor with prosecutorial "attempts to broaden the already pervasive
and wide-sweeping nets of conspiracy prosecutions." ' 10 Such statements, however, are belied by thejudicial expansion of United States
jurisdiction over extraterritorial narcotics conspiracies, and the laxity
that United States courts have taken to the pleading requirements in
conspiracy indictments.
By operation of double criminality, a narcotics conspiracy alleged to have occurred wholly outside the United States may not be
an extraditable offense under the laws of a foreign country. The
boilerplate form for conspiracy indictments used by many United
States prosecutors may fail to set out the charge in a way that enables
the foreign country to determine whether there is sufficient evidence
to support the warrant for extradition. In certain circumstances,
therefore, double criminality and nuances in foreign conspiracy law
may provide significant defenses for one whose extradition is sought
on a narcotics conspiracy charge against United States laws.
The recent expansion of United States jurisdiction over extraterritorial narcotics conspiracies is exemplified by United States v. RicardoIII and United States v. Mann.'

i2

In Ricardo the district court

determined it had jurisdiction over defendants charged with conspiracy to import marijuana, even though the conspiracy took place entirely outside the United States and was thwarted before any
marijuana was imported. The court ruled that the United States narcotics conspiracy laws had extraterritorial reach as long as defendants intended to violate those laws and to have the effects occur
within the United States.' B Similarly, in Mann the court ruled that
"[w]hen a conspiracy statute does not require proof of overt acts
110 Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 404 (1957); see United States v. Grassi,
616 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1980) (referring to conspiracy law as a "dragnet").
I H 619 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1980).
112 615 F.2d 668 (5th Cir. 1980).
113 Ricardo, 619 F.2d at 1128-29.
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[such as narcotics conspiracies under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 963], the
requirement of territorial effect may be satisfied by evidence that the
defendants intended their conspiracy to be consummated within the
nation's borders," ' " 4 even though the conspiracy took place outside
the United States.
Ricardo and Mann base this claim of jurisdiction upon the "objective territorial theory" under which courts may assert jurisdiction
over defendants who have committed offenses extraterritorially,
causing harmful effects within the United States." 5 It has been
noted, however, that in cases in which narcotics conspiracies were
thwarted wholly outside the United States, "the objective territorial
theory cannot be the vehicle for the assertion of jurisdiction, inasmuch as no harmful effect has actually occurred on the asserting
state's territory."' 16
It is significant that claims of jurisdiction similar to those in Ricardo and Mann may not give rise to extradition of a defendant
charged with a narcotics conspiracy that was consummated and
thwarted entirely outside the territorial borders of the United States.
For example, the treaty may provide that "[w]hen the offense for
which extradition has been requested has been committed outside
the territory of the requesting State, [the requested country] shall
have the power to grant the extradition if the laws of the requested
State provide for jurisdiction over such an offense committed in similar circumstances."' 17 This requires that the basis of jurisdiction
must satisfy the principle of double criminality.
France currently does not follow the jurisdictional rationale of
Ricardo and Mann. It does not recognize the objective territorial theory when a conspiracy is consummated and thwarted extraterritorially, because no effect of the crime has occurred on French
territory." 1 8 Rather, French law affords jurisdiction over an extraterritorial conspiracy only when one or more material elements of the
offense occurs within France. 1 9 "Thus, [under the principle of
double criminality], in a case of a thwarted extraterritorial narcotics
conspiracy to import narcotics into the United States, France would
not approve an extradition request based upon an objective territo120
rial theory of jurisdiction."'
In addition to this narrow jurisdictional defense, acute differ114 Mann, 615 F.2d at 671.
115 Ricardo, 619 F.2d at 1128; Mann, 615 F.2d at 671.
116 See Blakesley, United States Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crime, 73 J. CRIm. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY, 1109, 1145 (1982).
117 See U.S.-Australia Treaty, supra note 18, at art. IV.
118 C. Blakesley, Comparativistic Ruminations Upon the Expansion of Jurisdiction
Over Extraterritorial Crime 17 (Mar. 19, 1984) (unpublished manuscript).
119 Id.

120 Id. at 18.
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ences between United States and foreign law as to the content and
form of conspiracy indictments can give rise to a more widely applicable defense that may prevent extradition on such charges. Unlike
the United States, a number of foreign countries are particularly antipathetic to conspiracy charges that are duplicitous, multiplicitous,
or excessively vague. A conspiracy indictment fraught with such defects may make it impossible for the foreign tribunal to understand
the precise nature of the conspiracy charges to determine whether
there is sufficient evidence to support a warrant for extradition.
United States law, like much of foreign jurisprudence, recognizes that an indictment is duplicitous when it joins two or more distinct and separate offenses in a single count. A general verdict of
guilty will not reveal which crimes the defendant was found guilty of,
which may prejudice the defendant in sentencing, obtaining appellate review, and in protection from double jeopardy. A multiplicitous indictment is one that charges the same offense in several
12
counts and may lead to multiple sentences for the same offense. '
United States case law, however, generally has refused to uphold objections to narcotics conspiracy indictments that are, by strict definition, duplicitous or multiplicitous.1 2 2 Rather, a defendant faced with

a duplicitous indictment may move to have the Government elect
which of the multiple offenses charged in the same count will be relied upon and proved.' 23 In the case of a multiplicitous indictment,
the remedy is to require the government to elect the particular count
124
upon which it wishes to proceed and dismiss the others.
United States law also has tended to absolve vague conspiracy
indictments on practical grounds. 125 A conspiracy indictment usually is sufficient if it contains merely the essential elements of the
offense so that the defendant is informed of the charges against
him.' 26 Details need not be described with the same particularity
2 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 142 (1982).
122 See, e.g., United States v. Croucher, 532 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1976) (three separate
agreements alleged in one conspiracy count held not duplicitous); United States v. Robertson,562 F. Supp. 463 (W.D. La. 1983) (allegations of multiple conspiracies in single count
of indictment held not duplicitou's); United States v. Egan, 501 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (separate charges of conspiracy and attempt to import controlled substances found
in single section of indictment held not multiplicitous); see also United States v. Murray,
618 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Avila-Dominguez, 610 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir.
1980); Overstreet v. United States, 321 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1963); Brown v. United States,
299 F.2d 438 (D.C.Cir. 1962) (conspiracy counts charging violation of more than one federal statute held not duplicitous).
123 See, e.g., Thomas v. United States, 418 F.2d 567, 568 (5th Cir. 1969); United States
121

v. Goodman, 285 F.2d 378, 380 (5th Cir. 1960).
124 See, e.g., United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Co., 344 U.S. 218, 225 (1952).
125 See United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181, 1197 (5th Cir. 1981); United States
v. Willis, 583 F.2d 203, 207 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Markham, 537 F.2d 187, 192
(5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
126 See, e.g., United States v. Hajecate, 683 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Mouton, 657 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1981).
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that is required in charging substantive offenses. 1 27 Indeed, a conspiracy indictment may properly refer to unidentified coconspirators.

28

In contrast to the United States, some countries are more strict
about duplicitous, multiplicitous, or vague conspiracy indictments.
Under British law, for example, it is axiomatic that a conspiracy
29
count comply with the general rule of charging one offense only.'
"As has been said again and again, there must not be wrapped up in
one conspiracy charge what is, in fact, a charge involving two or
more conspiracies."' 3 0 Thus, in numerous British cases courts have
quashed convictions of defendants charged under duplicitous indictments where two separate offenses were charged in one count or, in
particular, where multiple conspiracies were found and only one
conspiracy was charged.131
Similarly, in Australia the court in Gerakiteys v. The Queen' 3 2 upheld quashed convictions on two conspiracy counts where the Crown
attempted to subsume several conspiracies within the single conspiracy charged in each count of the indictment. Judge Murphy said that
"conspiracy must not be allowed to become so amorphous that it will
create a real danger of concealed duplicity of charges, so that the
accused may be convicted
despite the lack of unanimity among the
13 3
jury members."'
The courts of Australia and Great Britain have expressed special
antipathy to prosecutorial attempts to juxtapose conspiracy charges
with substantive counts when such substantive counts are used as
predicates for establishing the conspiracy charges or vice versa. For
example, in Regina v. Hoar134 the Australian High Court was concerned that defendant could be subjected to multiple sentences on
the same offense when the prosecution had charged him with numerous substantive offenses, most of which constituted overt acts of the
conspiracy for which he was convicted. Observing that "[i]t has long
been established that prosecutions for conspiracy and for a substantive offense ought not to result in a duplication of penalty,"' 135 the
Hoar court warned that "[g]enerally speaking it is undesirable that
127 See United States v. Tavelman, 650 F.2d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 1981); United States
v. Inryco, 642 F.2d 290, 295 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Wander, 601 F.2d 1251,
1260 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Geise, 597 F.2d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1980).
128 United States v. Booty, 621 F.2d 1291, 1300 (5th Cir. 1980).
129 See, e.g., Rex v. Disney, [1933] 2 K.B. 138; Rex v. Molloy, [1921] 2 K.B. 364.
130 Regina v. Ardalan, [1972] All E.R. 257, 261.
131 See Regina v. Nicholls, [1960] 2 All E.R. 449, 450; Regina v. Dawson, [1960] 1 All
E.R. 558, 564; Regina v. Davey, [1960] 3 All E.R. 553, 540; Rex v. West, [1948] 1 K.B. 709,
712.
132 Judgment of Feb. 24, 1984, Austl. L.R. (currently unpublished).
133 Id. at 5.
134 37 Austl. L. R. 357 (1981).
'35 Id. at 361-62.
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conspiracy should be charged when a substantive offense has been
committed and there is a sufficient and effective charge that this offense has been committed."' 136 Likewise, British courts repeatedly
have disapproved of using substantive counts as predicates for estab37
lishing a conspiracy.'
Finally, foreign courts have been particularly opposed to excessively vague conspiracy charges. For example, a British court has
said that "each count of the indictment should be so framed as to
enable the jury to put their fingers on any specific part of the conspiracy as to which they are satisfied that the particular defendant is
proved to have been implicated and to convict him of that offense
only."' 13 8 This is so because "[i]t is not competent for the prosecution to invite the jury to wander through the wilderness of evidence
in the expectation that if they do not find one conspiracy proved they
may possibly find another."' 39 The need for precision in conspiracy
indictments has therefore been expressed consistently in British
cases. 140
Under Australian law, the reason for precise indictments is that
"[t]oo often, those prosecuting appear to adopt the view that an accused person must be guilty of something but rather than identifying
14
what that something is, choose a conspiracy charge as a dragnet."' '
For example, in Gerakiteys it was alleged in separate counts that between a specified period of time, defendant had conspired with one
Harrison and "divers other persons to cheat and defraud divers insurance companies," and second, conspired with that same individ42
ual "and divers other persons to defraud the Commonwealth."'1
The High Court quashed defendant's conviction on the two conspiracy counts, because they were so vague and amorphous that each
purported to allege one overall conspiracy where multiple conspiracies were apparent, and that apart from the lack of sufficient evidence
it was never alleged that the "divers other persons" knew of, or par43
ticipated in, a single, all-encompassing conspiracy.'
In large drug indictments, United States prosecutors have
tended to adopt boilerplate language in framing conspiracy charges
that invokes all the foregoing vices to which foreign courts typically
136 Id.
'37 See Regina v. Griffiths, [1966] 1 Q.B. 589, 599; Regina v. Dawson, [1960] 1 All E.R.

558, 563; Rex v. Partridge and Ors, 30 N.S.W. St. R. 410, 414 (1930); Rex v. Luberg, 19
Crim. App. 133 (1926).
138 Rex v. West, [1948] 1 K.B. 709, J.L.R. 241, 243.

139 Rex v. Partridge and Ors, 30 N.S.W. St. R. at 414.
140 See, e.g., Queen v. King, [1844] 7 Q.B. 782.
141 See supra note 132, at 5; see also Regina v. Hoar, 37 Austl. L.R. 357, 363-64 (1981).

The Hoar court stated, "The allurements of conspiracy charges are very great. The imprecision of the charges, the vagueness of the evidentiary rules, the tendency of committal
hearings to turn into fishing expeditions, often prove attractive to prosecutors.

142 See supra note 132, at 18.
143 Id.
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are antipathetic.
illustrative:

The following abbreviated hypothetical is

COUNT 1 (21 U.S.C. Sec. 963) CONSPIRACY TO IMPORT
MARIJUANA:
(A)

(B)

(C)

From on or about [X date], the exact date being unknown to
the Grand Jury and continuously thereafter up to and including the date of this indictment in the District of [Y], and divers
other districts, the defendants [20 defendants are then listed]
did conspire with each other and with other various persons,
both known and unknown, to unlawfully import marijuana.
MANNER AND MEANS: As part of the conspiracy, the defendants played different roles, took upon themselves different
tasks and participated in the affairs of the conspiracy through
various criminal acts. The roles assumed by these defendants
were interchangeable at various times throughout the conspiracy. Some of the roles which these defendants assumed and
carried out are as follows: [10 different roles are then listed
from "Financier or Owner" to "Currency Courier"].
OVERT ACTS: In furtherance of the conspiracy, the defendants and certain unindicted co-conspirators performed certain
overt acts in the District of [Y] and elsewhere, including the
following: [50 different overt acts then set out]. All such Acts
are in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 963.

COUNT 2 (21 U.S.C. Sec. 846) CONSPIRACY TO POSSESS
MARIJUANA WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE:
(A)
(B)
(C)

[Assume that this Section is nearly identical in content to
Count 1].
MANNER AND MEANS: The manner and means alleged in
Count 1 are realleged herein and incorporated by reference.
OVERT ACTS: The overt acts alleged in Count 1 are realleged herein and incorporated by reference. All such acts are
in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846.
[Assume further that the full indictment goes on to allege 30,
separate, substantive counts which
reallege most of the "Overt
14 4
Acts" listed in Counts 1 and 2.]

The significance of these hypothetical conspiracy counts is that

they might be quashed under the laws of countries such as Great
Britain and Australia. If the counts, as framed, were presented as the

basis of an extradition request by the United States, their duplicity,
multiplicity, and excessive vagueness should preclude extradition.
The duplicity of the hypothetical counts is evident, because the

"Manner and Means" and "Overt Acts" sections of each comprehend a series of different conspiracies, between different people, at
different times, in different roles, and with different purposes. On
the other hand, Count 1 purports to charge only a single conspiracy
to import marijuana, and Count 2 purports to charge only a single
144 The hypothetical is drawn from United States v. Riley, No. 83-166 (D.S.C. 1983).
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conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute. Apart from
the patent confusion presented by the form of these counts, both run
afoul of the rule that it is duplicitous to wrap up a charge involving
multiple conspiracies in one conspiracy charge.
The multiplicity of the hypothetical counts also is clear. Both
Counts 1 and 2 are embellished with the same fifty "Overt Acts,"
which are alleged again in most of the thirty substantive counts. In
this way, the United States Government has sought to charge many
of the thirty substantive counts in each of the conspiracy counts in
derogation of the rule that it is impermissible to charge the same
offense in more than a single count. As observed by the British
Court in Regina v. Griffiths, "far too often . . .accused persons are

joined in a charge of conspiracy without any real evidence from
which ajury may infer that their minds went beyond committing with
one or more other persons the one or 14more
specific acts alleged
5
counts."'
substantive
the
in
them
against
In addition to the duplicity and multiplicity problems raised by
the hypothetical conspiracy charges, the inherent vagueness of the
charges makes it impossible for a foreign tribunal to determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to support extradition. Typically, committal for extradition is warranted only if the foreign magistrate finds such evidence as would, in his opinion and according to
the requested country's law, justify the trial of the accused if the acts
constituting the crime[s] had taken place within the requested country. 1 46 The magistrate usually must determine "whether, if the evi-

dence stood alone at trial, a reasonable jury properly directed could
accept it and find a verdict of guilty.' 1 4 7 This application necessarily
must be undertaken with reference to "the offense with which the
[accused] is charged" under the treaty. 14 8 Thus, the contents of
each conspiracy count by which the accused is charged is integral to
defining the offense to which the foreign magistrate must apply the
evidence. If a particular count is so vague and amorphous that the
offense cannot be determined or defined clearly, a magistrate cannot
apply the evidence, and the count must fail.
The hypothetical conspiracy Counts 1 and 2 are so vague and
uninformative that it is impossible to determine precisely what is being charged. The counts mention twenty co-conspirators along
"with various other persons, both known and unknown." The
counts allege that the conspiracies were carried out by a variety of
means whereby "the defendants played different roles, took upon
themselves different tasks, participated

. .

.

through various criminal

145 [1966] 1 QB. 589, 599.
146 See, e.g.,
U.S.-Australia Treaty, supra note 18, at art. VI, 27 U.S.T. at 966-67.
147 Schtracks, [1962] 3 All E.R. at 533.
148 See, e.g., U.S.-Australia Treaty, supra note 18, at art. V1, 27 U.S.T. at 964.
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acts . . . [and assumed roles that] were interchangeable at various
times throughout the conspiracy." Ten different roles are then
listed, and the counts list fifty overt acts, concluding that "all such
acts are in violation of 21 U.S.C. 963 [and] 21 U.S.C. 846."
Each count appears to allege that at least fifty separate conspiracies existed to import marijuana, and another fifty separate conspiracies existed to possess marijuana with intent to distribute.
Moreover, none of the fifty overt acts allege any "agreement" to do
an unlawful act between two or more persons, because those acts
merely are repeated allegations of other offenses contained in the
indictment.
Even if this confusion could be resolved by construing Counts 1
and 2 as separate, single conspiracies, the charges are still defective.
For example, under Australian law, if a general conspiracy is alleged,
"each defendant must be shown to have been in communication with
[the other defendants] not for a purpose individual and special to the
individual but for a common design, a design common to all of them
to bring about [the crimes] on a grand scale." 149 The vague factual
allegations in Counts 1 and 2 do not show any common conspiratorial purpose, design, or knowledge between the twenty co-defendants. Rather, the "Overt Acts" and the "Manner and Means"
sections of the counts allege wholly different activities and roles between different defendants at different times and places.
Given the confusion as to whether each count alleges a single
conspiracy or multiple conspiracies, along with the patent vagueness
of each of the counts however they are construed, it is clear that they
fail to charge clearly defined offenses to which a foreign magistrate
could apply the evidence. The foreign magistrate cannot and should
not serve as a prosecutor and be expected to construct charges based
upon the evidence. It is the requesting country's responsibility to
articulate its charges with sufficient precision so that the magistrate
of the requested country can determine whether there is enough evidence to support extradition on the charges. Thus, the hypothetical
conspiracy counts should not support a warrant for extradition.
Finally, if the content and form of the conspiracy counts are insufficient to support extradition, or if the evidence by itself is insufficient, there is no curative remedy on appeal or application for habeas
corpus available in foreign countries. On appellate or habeas corpus
review, the court typically is limited to examining whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the offense charged is extraditable,
whether there was sufficient evidence to justify committal of the accused on the warrant, and whether there is no other bar to extradition under the applicable treaty.'

50

149 Exparte Caffey, I N.S.W.L.R. 434, 446 (1971).
150

See, e.g., Regina v. Governor of Brixton Prison, [1955] 1 Q.B. 540, 1 All E.R. 31;
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Alternatives to Extradition

While the United States professes to seek rendition of fugitives
under the "legal" authority of extradition treaties, 15 ' historically it
has circumvented such formal procedures through a variety of other
15 2
methods, such as kidnapping, exclusion, deportation, and comity.
These alternatives usually have been employed when there was no
applicable treaty, when formal extradition would have been timeconsuming and expensive, when the government had a weak case, or
where the double criminality principle would have barred extradition.153 Such alternative methods of rendition may apply to alleged
drug offenders.
The leading example of kidnapping is Ker v. Illinois,1 54 in which
the United States sought extradition of defendant from Peru on larceny charges. A warrant for extradition was prepared pursuant to
the treaty, and President Arthur directed a messenger to present the
warrant to the Peruvian authorities. Instead of doing so, the messenger pocketed the warrant, kidnapped defendant, and brought him
back to the United States. Defendant argued that he could be removed from Peru to the United States only in accordance with the
treaty. The Court, however, held that because defendant was not
brought to the United States pursuant to the treaty, he had no rights
under it. Rather, his sole redress would be to sue the messenger for
trespass and false imprisonment. Peru then could seek extradition of
the messenger on kidnapping charges.
The Ker case has withstood subsequent challenge. For example,
in United States v. Sobell' 55 defendant protested his kidnapping, which
was effectuated by collaboration between FBI agents and Mexican
police. The court of appeals upheld the district court's jurisdiction
to try defendant on espionage charges saying that:
it can hardly be maintained ... that the unlawful and unauthorized
acts of the Mexican police acting in behalf of subordinate agents of
the executive branch of the United States Government were any
more acts of the United States than the unlawful and unauthorized
56
acts of the emissary of the Chief Executive [in Ker v. Illinois].1
While Ker and its progeny do not provide a deterrent to kidnapping as an alternative to formal extradition, overzealous abductors
may find themselves subject to an extradition request on kidnapping
charges by the foreign country where the crime was committed. For
Regina v. Governor of Holloway Prison, in re Siletti, 71 L.J. Rep. 933 (1902); Schtracks,
[1962] 3 All E.R. at 549-50.
1 See Factor, 290 U.S. at 287.
152 Evans, Acquisition of Custody over the InternationalFugitive Offender-Alternatives to Extra-

dition: A Survey of United States Practice, in BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 77-104 (vol. XL, 1966).
153 Id.
154 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
155 244 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1957).
156 Id. at 525.
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example, in Vaccaro v. Collier'5 7 officials of the United States and Canada agreed to allow a United States narcotics agent and his informant
to entice two suspected drug smugglers to cross from Canada into
the United States and sell drugs to the agents who would then arrest
the smugglers. The plan was foiled partially when one of the smugglers declined to participate. In the ensuing events one smuggler
was killed, and the one who had initially declined to participate was
taken by force into the United States. Subsequently, the Canadian
Government sought extradition of the United States agent and his
informant on charges of kidnapping, murder, and larceny. Ultimately, the United States agent was extradited on the kidnapping
58

charge. 1

It should be noted, however, that the deterrent suggested by
Vaccaro may be vacuous where the acts of a United States agent are
characterized as an "act of state." If they are so characterized, extradition might be precluded on grounds of immunity. 159 This leaves
the Ker kidnapping method subject only to the academic admonition
"that the use of such methods can become sufficiently notorious to
lead to political or other public repercussions, embarrassing to the
governments of both countries concerned.

.

. [and] result in an am-

of law which
bivalent attitude toward an aspect of the administration
60
has international as well as national ramifications."'1
While the century-old Ker case continues to stand for the rule
that the jurisdiction of United States courts over a criminal defendant is not impaired by the manner in which he was brought from
another country,' 6 ' Ker may be distinguished to produce a different
result in at least one situation. For example, if the United States actually commences extradition proceedings pursuant to a treaty and
then kidnaps the defendant, it is arguable that jurisdiction should be
declined. This follows from the principle in United States v. Rauscher
that "the courts are bound to take judicial notice of, and to enforce
in any appropriate proceeding the rights of persons growing out of
[a] treaty ....

162

Thus, where a treaty provides that "the person whose extradition is sought shall have the right to use such remedies as are provided by [the] law [of the requested state]," 16 3 and that "a person
extradited under this Treaty shall not be detained, tried or punished
in the territory of the requesting State for an offence other than that
157 38 F.2d 862 (D. Md. 1930), afd in part and rev'd in part, 51 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1931).
158 Collier, 51 F.2d at 17.
159
160
161
162
163

See Dep't of State Ms. File No. 211.42 (which raised that possibility).
Evans, supra note 152, at 102-03.
21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 381 (1965).
119 U.S. 407, 419 (1886); see also Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884).
See U.S.-Australia Treaty, supra note 18, at art. X, 27 U.S.T. 957 at 970.
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for which extradition has been granted,"' 6 4 it may be argued that
because extradition was never granted on any offense due to the supervening kidnapping, United States courts have no jurisdiction over
the defendant. 1 6 5 In contrast to the facts in Ker, in this example the
United States already has commenced formal extradition proceedings such that the treaty has become the "law of the land" to be en66
forced by the courts as they would enforce any act of Congress.'
Practically, any attempt to distinguish Ker is frustrating. It is,
however, fundamentally inconsistent with the antipathy that both
federal and state courts have taken to circumstances where parties in
civil cases have attempted to invoke jurisdiction by unlawful acts. For
example, in Ruggieri v. General Well Service, Inc. 167 the court declared

that jurisdiction should be denied where a defendant is enticed unfairly into a state and served with process. It is hard to imagine how
courts can condemn attempts to invoke jurisdiction by unlawful acts
in civil actions, and condone such acts when jurisdiction is claimed in
criminal cases. The Ker reasoning that the accused may not object to
jurisdiction because the kidnapping occurred outside the United
States belies the rationale adopted by courts in civil actions that as a
matter of policy, courts should deny jurisdiction over persons or
matters by becoming a de facto party to those who seek to invoke
jurisdiction by criminal acts.
The United States occasionally has sought to induce foreign
countries to exclude or deport criminal defendants as alternative
methods to extradition. The method of "exclusion" simply takes the
form of convincing a foreign country to prevent the accused from
entering its borders, thereby forcing him to return to the United
States to face prosecution. For example, the United States requested
Argentina to exclude a defendant charged with bigamy when the
treaty between the two countries did not list bigamy as an extraditable offense.' 68 Similarly, when the offenses were not extraditable
under a treaty, the United States separately has requested various
countries to deport defendants on charges of conspiracy to smuggle
164 Id. at art. XIV(2), 27 U.S.T. 957 at 981.
165 But cf. Shapiro, 478 F.2d at 906 (holding that the specialty principle whereby defendant may not be tried in requesting state for an offense for which he was not extradited
was not a right that could be raised by defendant).
166 Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 419.
167 535 F. Supp. 525, 530 (D. Colo. 1982); see also Emert v. Groomer, 131 Okla. 58,
268 P.2d 204 (1980) (in which court declared that "[w]e are unwilling to lay down the rule
that officers of the law, by strong arm methods, may make their unlawful acts the basis for

seizure of property to support court jurisdiction"); Sawyer v. LaFlamme, 123 Vt. 229, 185
A.2d 466 (1962) (stating that "[a] court will refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favor of a
party that has used unlawful means to obtain service").
168 Dep't State Ms. File No. 235.11 C. 51 (Argen. 1921). The United States also requested exclusion by Great Britain and Guatemala in connection with a fugitive charged
with violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act. See Dep't State Ms. File No. 241.11 M. 132

(U.K. 1934); Dep't State Ms. File No. 212.11 L. 16 (Guat. 1923).
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liquor, 169 fraud by use of the mails, 170 assault on a federal agent,' 7 1
172
and extortion by impersonation of a police officer.
Finally, the United States occasionally has used comity as an alternative to formal extradition. 173 Requests for rendition based on
comity have been employed when there was no extradition treaty, or
when the treaty did not cover the offense for which rendition was
sought. For example, comity was the basis for rendition of United
States citizens from Italy on nonextraditable
charges of importing
74
narcotics and conspiring to import heroin.'
Similarly, in United States v. Paroutian'75 defendant was surrendered to the United States from Lebanon on narcotics conspiracy
charges in the absence of any extradition treaty between the two
countries. By definition, comity seems to imply reciprocal cooperative relations between the requesting and requested countries. The
method used by the United States, however, typically has been onesided: the policy of the State Department has been to warn the requested country that reciprocity cannot be assured by the United
176
States in similar circumstances.
As circumventions to formal extradition procedure, these alternatives do not afford protection for the accused. The use of such
methods as substitutes for treaty procedure not only denigrates due
process, but reflects a wanton disregard for international law. While
the rendition of alleged criminals is an important international effort,
the rights of the accused should not be ignored for the sake of administrative or judicial convenience. Thus, strict adherence to formal extradition procedure in accordance with the principles of
double criminality and specialty always should be observed. This
should be true particularly for western democracies that hold themselves out as venerable protectors of individual liberties.
VI.

Conclusion

For most practitioners, international extradition is a footnote to
criminal defense law. Generally, the United States has gone to the
trouble of seeking extradition only in cases deemed most worthy of
prosecutorial pursuit. Particularly in the context of alleged drug offenders, however, requests for international extradition are likely to
become more routine because of current political attitudes and ex169 Dep't State Ms. File No. 244 E. I I (Bahamas 1932).
170 Dep't State Ms. File No. 212.11 (Mex. 1939).
171 Dep't State Ms. File No. 212.11 (Mex. 1940-41).
172 Dep't State Ms. File No. 242.11 (Can. 1935-36).
173 N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1963, at 28, col. 1.
174 Fiocconi, 462 F.2d at 475.
175 299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962).
176 See Letter from Acting Secretary of State (Smith) to Lester Sandles (Apr. 23, 1953)
(Dep't State Ms. File No. 254, 115 Bender, Ludwig/4-253).
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pectations, and because the stringency of United States laws may in-

duce sought-after drug offenders to take their chances in a foreign
country. Thus, what still is a footnote of criminal defense law may
soon become common nomenclature for domestic defense lawyers.

